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The main aim of this paper is to study European regional disparities 
in unemployment, considering regional productive structures and 
some regional institutional variables. It is widely known that one most 
important stylized facts concerning the EU consists in regional 
disparities among regions. Such differences relate to both income per 
capita and the labour market, the latter generally measured in terms of 
unemployment rates. In a recent paper (Amendola, Caroleo Coppola, 
2004) we have analyzed the economic structure of the EU’s regions 
using proxies for the productive structure and the labour market. In 
this paper we estimate a panel data model where the dependent 
variable is the regional unemployment rate and the independent 
variables relate to the productive structure and some regional 
institutional aspects. The results confirm that institutional variables, 
such as the centralization of wage bargaining, the decentralization of 
public expenditure and the level of bureaucracy, have important 
impacts on unemployment rates. 
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 5 
Introduction 
The problem of regional disparities is a crucial theme in the debate on the economic and 
political process of constructing the European Union. In fact, if we compare the United 
States with the European Union, we find that the convergence process is slower in the 
latter. Moreover, in the same period, disparities among regions have persisted or 
increased.   
It is possible to cite numerous examples of the persistence of regional disparities: the 
unsolved problem of German unification (Marani, 2004), the absence of growth recorded 
by many less-developed regions in Mediterranean Europe (Caroleo and Destefanis 
2005), and the slow transition of the East European countries (Perugini e Signorelli 
2004). 
The implications in terms of economic theory and policy are of great significance. In 
fact, no growth theory developed so far, neither for instance the neoclassical theory nor 
the endogenous theory, nor the new economic geography, are able fully to explain the 
European case (European Commission 2000; De la Fuente 2000). As regards economic 
policy aspects, to be noted is that the EU’s cohesion policy has been unable to promote 
economic integration, although this is the prerequisite for the full operation of the 
European Union’s fiscal and monetary policy  (Boldrin and Canova 2001; Ederveen and 
Gorter 2002). There is almost unanimous agreement in the debate that the institutional 
and economic conditions regulating the labour market exert major effects on the 
convergence process. In fact, regional convergence is measured in terms of GDP per 
capita and/or in terms of the employment rate and productivity level. Econometric 
estimates confirm that the slow convergence process and the existence of clusters of 
homogenous regions – internally convergent but mutually divergent – in the EU is caused 
by employment rate dynamics (European Commission 2004; for a survey see Daniele 
2002), and consequently by labour market characteristics. It is consequently important to 
study the institutional mechanisms that regulate the labour market, as well as the 
characteristics of labour demand and supply, and their dependence  on spatial factors 
(Nienhur, 2000) 
As said, studies on economic development and regional convergence regard the 
employment rate as the variable that seems best able to represent labour market 
conditions. Since the Lisbon European Council, the European employment strategy itself 
has set quantitative objectives based on the employment rate. At the same time, an 
increasing number of studies (Marelli 2004 and 2005; Garibaldi and Mauro 2002) have 
analysed regional disparities on the basis of this variable.  
On the other hand, there is broad consensus in Europe on the OECD’s contention that 
the ‘Eurosclerosis problem’ of the 1990s was due to institutional rigidities in the European 
labour market which generated the growth of the equilibrium unemployment. The 
theoretical underpinning of this thesis is that there exists a structural unemployment rate: 
that is, an equilibrium rate to which the labour market converges when, in the absence of 
exogenous shocks, all prices and wages have been completely adjusted (Layard et al. 
1991). Within this theoretical framework, empirical analysis has sought to demonstrate 
that the different unemployment dynamics of the European countries depend mainly on 
micro-level real labour market frictions, such as the wage bargaining power of workers 
and/or of unions, information and incentives at firm-level, job search and matching 
efficiency (Nickell, 1997; Nickell e Layard, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; for a 
survey see also Caroleo, 2000).  
The basic idea of this study is that the regional and/or national disparities in Europe 
are caused not only by differences among productive structures and the technological 6 
and economic conditions that determine employment levels but also by differences 
among the institutional arrangements that regulate labour markets. In other words, we 
maintain that these factors may contribute to creating or sustaining the divergence or 
persistence of disparities among regions.  
The next section sets out some stylized facts showing that the unemployment rate 
may be a better indicator of regional labour-market differences. The third section 
describes the variables chosen to explain the functional relationship among the 
unemployment rate, as the dependent variable, the productive structure, and labour-
market institutions. Then explained is the methodology used to obtain those variables. 
The last section reports the results of the econometric estimations. The conclusions 
contain some final remarks. 
1. The stylized facts  
The most important stylized fact concerning the European Union is depicted by Figures 1 
and 2, which show the index numbers of the mean, mean square error, and coefficient of 
variation of the employment rate (Figure 1) and of the unemployment rate (Figure 2) 
relative to 130 European regions for the period 1991 to 2000. Two important stylized facts 
can be observed: the first is that during the 1990s the unemployment rate displayed a 
more marked cyclicity than did the employment rate; the second is that the variability of 
the unemployment rate at regional level was much higher than that of the employment 
rate. 
 





































Figure 2. The Unemployment rate: Mean, Mean Square Deviation, and 




































This second stylized fact suggests that analysis of regional disparities should focus on 
the variables that affect the unemployment rate. Elrhost (2000) lists regional variables 
connected with the labour market that may generate divergence processes among 
regions. These variables can be summarized as follows: the endowment of production 
factors and ‘fundamentals’; the  structure of local labour markets (Genre and Gòmez-
Salvador, 2002) in terms of demographic growth, population age-structure, migration, and 
commuting (Greenway, Upward and Wright, 2002); the employment level; the productive 
structure (Marelli, 2003; Paci and Pigliaru, 1999; Paci, Pigliaru and Pugno, 2002); 
demographic density and urbanization (Taylor and Bradley 1997); economic and social 
barriers; human capital; the institutional structure regulating the goods markets and the 
labour market; and the wages composition (Pench, Sestito and Frontini,1999; Hyclack 
and Johnes 1987). 
With no claim to exhaustiveness, in what follows we shall test some of the hypotheses 
outlined above. To this end, we shall estimate the relationship between the 
unemployment rate, measured at the regional level, and a set of variables that includes 
some institutional indicators and the most important regional economic characteristics. 
2. The independent variables  
The independent variables used for our analysis may be classified into three groups: 
(a) productive structure and labour market indicators, (b) institutional indicators, and (c) 
variables relative to regional economic performance. 
Indicators of the productive structure and labour market 8 
We began by estimating a proxy for the labour market and productive structures of the 
regions. For this purpose, we calculated two indicators by applying a dynamic multivariate 
factorial analysis. This method is well suited to the study of multidimensional phenomena 
like regional disparities because the regions (cases) can be analyzed on the basis of a 
set of indicators (variables) that change over the years (time). 
We decided (Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola 2004) to apply the STATIS (Structuration 
des Tables A Trois Indeces de la Statistique) method (Escoufier 1985 and 1987). This is 
a dynamic multivariate method able to cluster regions year by year on the basis of a set 
of variables comprising labour market and income indicators, as well as indicators of the 
population structure and the structure of the productive sector. It is thus possible to study 
how the interaction between the labour market structure and economic growth changes 
over time, and also to analyze the dynamics of regions.  
The variables used for this analysis are listed in Table 3.2. They were taken from the 
Eurostat REGIO database and the European regions database of Cambridge 
Econometrics Ltd. and they are, as said, indicators characteristic of the labour market 
and the production system (Wishlade and Yuill, 1997). Labour demand was measured by 
the employment rate (TOT), while the labour supply was measured by the labour-force 
participation rate (TAT). The percentage of the long-term unemployed (ULR) was used as 
a proxy for the structural gap between labour demand and supply. The percentage of 
part-time employment (PTT) was used as a measure of the flexibility of the regional 
labour market. 
The production system was represented by four variables corresponding to the 
percentages of employed persons in agriculture (AGR), industry (IND), traditional 
services – commerce, hotels and non-market services (GHM) – and advanced services – 
transport, financial services and others (IJA). The other variables considered were 
population density (DEN), as a proxy for the gravitational force of a region, and per capita 
income (PPS), which is the indicator most frequently used to represent regional 
disparities. 9 
 
      
Table 1 
Variables used in the STATIS analysis 
N Proxy  Variable  Measure  Acr. 
1 Gravitational 
force of the 
region 
Population density  Inhabitants /sq km  DEN 
2  Labour Supply  total activity rate  labour force/population aged 
over 15 
TAT 
3  Labour demand  employment rate  employed/population  aged 
over 15 
TOT 
4 Structural gap 
between Labour 
and Supply 





5  Flexibility of the 
regional labour 
market 
part-time employment rate part-time  employed/total 
employed 
PTT 
6  percentage employment in
agriculture 
employed in agriculture/ 
total employed 
AGR 
7  percentage employment in
industry 
employed in industry/total 
employed 
IND 
8  percentage employment in
traditional services 
employed in retail trade, 
hotels and non-market 









employed in transport, 
financial and other 






per capita income  per  capita  GDP  in 




The European regions represent 130 cases. The European regions selected were 
disaggregated at a level intended to cover the entire territory and to provide the maximum 
disaggregation possible with the data available. This level corresponded to the Nuts 2 
level for Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal; Nuts 1 for Belgium, Germany, 
Holland, Finland, the United Kingdom; Nuts 0 for Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden, for which countries there are no Nuts 1 and Nuts 2 disaggregations (or there are 
no data available with which to perform such disaggregations)
1
. We must point out that, 
unfortunately, does not exists a unique regional disaggregation for Europe generally 
adopted in the empirical literature on regional disparities. The regional disaggregation 
that we use depends on the availability of statistics and is similar to the those that can be 
found in other papers (i.e. Paci Piglaru Pugno, 2002; Basile et al. 2003). 
The time period was 1991- 2000
2
. 
                                                           
1 The complete list of the 130 regions is given on request.  
2 It is not possible to extend our analysis over 2000, since the value of some institutional variables that we use 
in the econometric estimation exists only until this year. 
 10 
The STATIS methodology, as said, consists in the analysis of the three-way matrix 
(tXij), where t denotes the temporal observations, i the regions, and j the variables 
(i=1,2...I; j=1,2...J; t=1,2...T), obtained by the succession of T matrices  j i t X , of the same 
dimensions. 
The analysis moves through three phases: interstructure, compromise and 
infrastructure. The output from the interstructure phase describes the structure of the T 
matrices in a vectorial space smaller than T. This is reduced to two dimensions but still 
maintains a good similarity to the initial representation. The compromise phase consists 
in the estimation of a synthesis matrix which yields a representation, in the two-
dimensional space identified, of the characteristic indicators and of the average positions 
of the regions in the time-span analysed (1991-2000). The result of this intrastructure 
phase is a representation of the trajectories followed by the individual regions in the same 
period of time. 
 
Table 2 
Eigenvalues and inertia percentages of the factorial axes 
Axis  Eigenvalue  Variance explained  Cumulated variance 
explained 
1 3.75547 36.76 36.76 
2 1.99895 19.56 56.32 
3 1.18853 11.63 67.95 
 
In order to evaluate the goodness of the factorial representation yielded by 
construction of the compromise matrix, Table 2 shows the first three highest eigenvalues 
and the percentage of the total variance explained by the first three factorial axes. 
To be noted first is that 36.8% of the variance is explained by the first factor, and 
19.6% by the second, for a total of 56.3% of the variance expressed by the set of all the 
variables. In other words, the first factor alone explains more than one-third of the total 
variability, while the first three factors jointly explain almost 68%. Consequently, the 
reduction of the phenomenon’s variability, obtained by representing it in a two or three 
dimensional space, is a meaningful synthesis of the information considered. 
In order to interpret the two figures, we may refer to Table 2, which shows that 
minimum and maximum period values of the correlations between the variables and the 
factorial axes. It will be seen that the variables most closely correlated with the first factor 
are, on the one hand, the employment rate (TOT), the activity rate (TAT), the percentage 
of part-time employment (PTT), per capita income (PPS), and the percentage of 
employment in advanced services; and on the other (positive quadrant), the percentage 
of long-term unemployment (ULR), and the percentage of employment in agriculture 
(AGR). In other words, along the first axis one observes a clear polarization between the 
labour market indicators and those relative to the production structure. 
Along the second axis one observes a close correlation among, on the one hand, 
population density (DEN), per capita income (PPS), and the percentages of employment 
in traditional services (GHM) and advanced services (IJA), and on the other, the 
percentage of employment in industry (IND) and in agriculture (AGR), and the 
employment rate (TOT). In this case, we may state that the second axis identifies in 
marked manner only the phenomena representing variables located in the positive 
quadrant, namely those correlated with the territorial dimension. In fact, the indicators in 
this quadrant represent highly urbanized areas, or ones which contain rail or road 
infrastructures or sea ports, or with high levels of tourism. The negative quadrant, by 
contrast, comprises indicators which are more difficult to interpret and concern a mix of 11 
factors, such as low population density, the presence of agricultural employment, and 




Correlations between the variables and the factorial axes (minimum and maximum 
period values) 
Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3 
 Min  Max  Min  Max   Min  Max 
TAT -0.83  -0.75  IND -0.51 -0.47 IND -0.77  -0.71 
TOT -0.78  -0.72  TOT -0.42 -0.37 PPS -0.36  -0.27 
PTT -0.76  -0.69  AGR  -0.36 -0.34 ULR -0.18  0.07 
PPS  -0.69 -0.63  TAT  -0.34 -0.30 GHM  -0.09 -0.04 
IJA -0.66  -0.64  PTT  -0.11 -0.03 TOT  0.14  0.25 
IND  -0.34  -0.22  IJA 0.27 0.30 IJA 0.14  0.20 
DEN -0.30  -0.29  ULR  0.30 0.38 DEN 0.15  0.16 
GHM -0.17  -0.07  PPS  0.33 0.36 TAT  0.19  0.32 
ULR  0.58 0.64  GHM  0.64 0.73 PTT  0.21 0.33 
AGR 0.70  0.72  DEN 0.73 0.73 AGR 0.47  0.49 
Source: Our calculations on Eurostat REGIO data and on the Cambridge Econometrics 
database 
 
In conclusion the European regions seem to lie along the two factorial axes that 
represent certain characteristics of the labour market and the productive structure. The 
first factor (FF) can be interpreted as being a proxy for the ‘bad’ performance of the 
labour market. It should be pointed out that the variable has an opposite sign with respect 
to the development indicator: the regions that achieve a good performance in terms of 
activity rate and employment rate, and higher per capita income levels, have negative 
values for this factor. By contrast, those regions that have high long-term unemployment 
rates and high percentages of employed in agriculture have positive values.  
The second factor (SF) may be interpreted as a factor that is positive correlated with 
urbanization and a highly developed tertiary sector. 
Institutional Variables 
If the first factor obtained by STATIS can be interpreted as the labour market’s level of 
efficiency and flexibility, further indicators of the rigidity/flexibility of the labour market are 
the degree of decentralization of its regulatory institutions and, particularly, the level of 
wage bargaining centralization  (Calmfors, 1993; Calmfors and Driffil, 1988). 
The ‘European model’ has long been characterized by a centralized wage bargaining 
structure strictly related to industrial relations, that is, an institutional framework centred 
on employment protection and also centralized, universalistic and egalitarian. 
Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a tendency to decentralize labour market 
policies to a subnational (i.e. regional) level, the reason being that that participation in 
bargaining by the local institutions is viewed as a way to achieve a higher level of regional 
cohesion in the EU (Buti, Pench and Sestito, 1998; Soltwedel, Dohse and Kreige-Boden, 
1999). 
The debate on bargaining has usually focused on centralized or decentralized wage 
bargaining in its vertical form (i.e from national to firm level) (Freeman and Gibbson 
1993). Firm-level bargaining is considered by the OECD (OECD,1999) as the only 
arrangement able to reduce regional disparities because it ties the bargained wage to 
local labour market conditions and to regional labour productivity levels (for the Italian 
                                                           
3 See Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola 2004) for a more complete analysis. 12 
case see Antonelli and Paganetto 1999; Biagioli, Caroleo and Destefanis 1999 and, more 
recently, Dell’Aringa 2005). 
There are many possible objections to this approach. It has been pointed out that 
there is a variety of bargaining systems available (at regional level or by occupation), and 
on the other hand that there is a coordination problem (Amendola, Caroleo and Garofalo, 
1997). If we consider these two aspects together, it is possible to show that economic 
performance can be improved by both centralized and decentralized bargaining, in that 
each enables account to be taken of structural elements determining unemployment, 
such as regional differences among occupations, age and gender. 
It should be borne in mind that bargaining decentralization cannot be separated from 
industrial relations arrangements. This aspect is of crucial importance in understanding 
the reasons for a reform which aims at decentralizing the wage bargaining system but at 
the same time takes account of different institutional frameworks and coordination issues. 
In other words, industrial relations concern the system of employment protection which 
provides security against (i) the risk of future unemployment and job precariousness, (ii) 
barriers to human capital development, (iii) restriction of the right to work, and (iv) 
obstacles to worker representation. These components of the industrial relations system 
should be adjusted according to the characteristics of local labour markets. Indeed, active 
labour market policies are aimed at implementing arrangements appropriate to particular 
local labour market characteristics and which also involve several actors and procedures.  
A decentralized industrial relations system must go beyond mere decentralization of 
the administrative bureaucratic system. It should involve the most important local actors, 
and it should implement consensus-based actions with shared responsibilities (Regini, 
2002, Arrighetti and Seravalli, 1999). Only in this way can a kind of employment growth 
that is both quantitative and qualitative be obtained; in other words, only in this way can 
greater flexibility be given to the labour market without losing the necessary protections. 
For this reason, recent tendencies to decentralize industrial relations have been 
interpreted as a shift to local and territorial concertation taking the form of a pact among 
the social partners.  
For the purposes of our analysis, the best proxy for the institutional decentralization of 
the labour market would have been a variable related to the level of decentralized 
bargaining and of the extent to which the industrial relations system is regionally 
organized. Unfortunately, homogeneous data at the European level were not available. 
We could consequently only use the standard indicator of bargaining centralization 
(CENTR), which combines the levels of wage bargaining centralization and of wage 
coordination among the most important trade unions (Checchi and Lucifora 2002
4
; Boeri, 
Brugiavini and Calmfors 2002). 
The underlying hypothesis was that the more the bargaining on wages takes place at 
the level of the individual firm, the more account must be taken of that firm’s productivity 
level, given that it is necessarily affected by the local economic conditions. 
A further institutional aspect considered in our analysis was the administrative 
decentralization of the public administration. We chose two indicators for this aspect: the 
first was the degree of centralization of public expenditure (CFG); the second was an 
index of bureaucracy (BUREAUCRACY).  The former was calculated as the ratio 
between expenditure by the central administration and total public expenditure.
5  The 
lower this ratio, the higher will be the percentage of expenditure by the local 
administration. This ratio represents, in our opinion, a good proxy of the decentralization 
                                                           
4  This dataset contains annual data until 1998 with a low variability along the time, as the centralized or 
decentralised bargaining systems have not changed very much year by year.  
5  The variable was calculated as the ratio between total expenditure minus local expenditure and total 
expenditure. (Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook & supplement Finance statistics Yearbook 
2003). 13 
of public expenditure powers to the regional level. The index of bureaucracy was not 
disaggregated at national level and can be considered a proxy of the public 
administration’s efficiency.6 
Variables for the economic performances of regions 
The third group of variables comprised two widely-used regional development 
indexes: the percentage variation of the Gross Value Added at constant price (GRPR) 




List of the Dependent Variables 
Acronym Variables 
CONS   Constant 
FF  Index factor of the labour market’s performance 
(the variable has an opposite sign related to development’s 
index) 
SF  Index factor of tertiary/urbanization 
CENTR   bargaining centralization index 
CGF  Level of public expenditure centralization 
BUREAUCRACY Bureaucracy  index 
GDPG  GDP annual growth at constant price 
INVPOP investment/population 
3. The Estimation Method: The Panel Data analysis  
Our dataset was a Panel where the cases were regions and the time units were the years 
from 1991 to 2000. We accordingly used panel data econometric methods in order to 
study the relationship between the unemployment rate and the set of independent 
variables.  
The model may be written as 
it it it z x y ε α β α + + + =
' '
0  [1] 
where  n i ,....... 1 = ,  T t . ,......... 1 = .   0 a is the constant, β  is the vector of coefficients, 
it x  contains K regressors and the matrix  it z , is a set of non-observable variables that 
captures the specific effects due to the characteristics of the individuals, which in our 
study were 109 European regions
9.  it ε   is the error term.  
The variables in  it z  are not observed and may be correlated or not correlated with the 
regressors. In the former case, in model [1] the intercept is group specific and is constant 
over time. This is the Fixed Effects model and may be written as:  
it i it it x a y ε α β + + + =
'
0  [2] 
                                                           
6This variable is contained in the www.countrydata.com databank and is an indicator of the quality of 
bureaucracy at national level.  
7The last two variables are from European Regions databank of Cambridge Econometrics Ltd.  
8The values of the variables CENTR, CGF, BUREAUCRACY are at national level and we assumed that they 
are the same for the regions of the same country. Our econometric estimations did not consider Luxembourg (1 
region), Greece (13 regions) and Portugal (7 regions). Twenty-one regions were excluded from the econometric 
analysis because the CENTR variable was not available form them.   
9 As said, the CENTR variable was not available for some countries. 14 
In the latter case, the model is defined as a Random Effects model. The variables of 
the matrix  it z  are unobservable and uncorrelated with the  it x . In this case the model 
becomes  
it i it it u x y ε β α + + + =
'
0  [3] 
where  i u  is the group-specific stochastic term.   
The difference between the fixed effect and the random effect model resides in the 
nature of the individual component  i α  (in the fixed model)  and  i u  in the random model. 
In the fixed effects model,  i α  is deterministic and captures the individual’s 
characteristics. It assumes different values for each single individual; it is constant over 
time; and because it is related to the characteristics of the individual, it is correlated with 
the variables  i x . In the Random Effects model, the term  i u  has a group specific random 
distribution. The term  i u  is a stochastic variable and is not correlated with the i x  because 
these variables are not stochastic. 
The Fixed Effect model is useful for territorial – inter-country or inter-regional – 
comparisons, as in our case, because it can be plausibly supposed that the non-observed 
characteristics captured by the variables are constant over time (Green, 2003). However, 
it is possible  to determine which is the better specification – fixed effect or random effect 
– by using the Hausmann test.
10
 
The model estimated is as follows: 
 
it i it it it
it it it it it it
CGF CGF CENTR
Y BUREAUCRAC INVPOP GDPR SF FF a UNRATE
ε ν β β β
β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
2                  8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1
 
where a is the constant,  8 1......β β  are the parameters,  i υ  is the individual component 
and it ε  the error term
11
. The acronyms of the variables are reported in the above list. The 
variable that measures the level of public expenditure centralization (CFG) is also 
considered in its quadratic form (CFG2) in order to test the hypothesis of a quadratic 
relationship of this variable with the unemployment rate and, consequently, the existence 
of an optimal dimension in the degree of centralization of public expenditure.  
                                                           
10 This Test is based on the statistics   ( )( ) ( ) r f r f r f V V W β β β β − − − =
−1 '
where  f β and r β  are 
respectively the fixed effects and the random effect coefficients and   f V , r V . are their relative variance-
covariance matrixes. Under the null hypothesis the statistics W is distributed as a  () k
2 χ where  k  is the 
number of coefficients inβ , intercept excluded. The null hypothesis is no correlation between the stochastic 
term and  it x , and hence the absence of any systematic difference between the random effects  and fixed 
effects coefficients. In the former case, random effects are better than fixed effects because they are more 
efficient. In the opposite case the fixed effects are better because the estimates are consistent.  11 We do not 
use the level of the GDP per capita as regressor, because this variable has been already used in the STATIS 
analysis and is partly represented by the first factor. 15 
4.Results 
Table 4 sets out the results. Reported in the third and fourth columns are respectively the 
Random Effects and the Fixed Effects estimates. For the sake of completeness, this table 
also includes the OLS estimation (column 1), and the Random effect model is obtained 
by using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (columns 1).  
The signs of the coefficients obtained with the four estimation methods are always the 
same. The Hausmann test rejects the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between 
the dependent variables and the error terms. This is the fundamental hypothesis of the 
random effects model, and because it is rejected, we may conclude that the Fixed Effect 
model is the well-specified model.  
The result confirms the theoretical hypotheses formulated in the previous sections. In 
particular,  the coefficients in the Fixed Effect Model are all statistically significant and 
they have the expected sign. Only the variable GDPR – the annual growth rate of gross 
value added per capita – is significant only at the 8% level. 
The dependent variables are expressed in different measures. Accordingly, in order to 
compare the magnitude of their effects on the unemployment rate, we calculated the 
standard coefficients
12
 of the variables and the elasticity to their mean value (tab. 5).
13
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
The results obtained seem to confirm our initial hypothesis: namely that the 
unemployment rate is correlated with the extent to which wage bargaining is 
decentralized14, with the institutional efficiency of regions, and also with the bureaucracy 
level, although the impact of this last variable on the unemployment rate is small.   
The centralization level of the public expenditure has a quadratic relationship with the 
unemployment rate. This means that the unemployment level grows together with the 
degree to which public expenditure is centralized, but in a less than proportional way, 
until the value of the centralization ratio is equal to 75%. Above that value unemployment 
                                                           








i i β β =  where  x β  is the parameter of the variable i x , 
x s and  y s  are respectively the standard deviations of the variable  i x  and y. It may be useful to 
make an example to better understand the meaning of  the standard coefficients. The standard 
coefficient of the variable SF (Table 5) is 0.6; this means that a unit standard deviation of SF 
causes a standard deviation of the unemployment rate equal to 0.6.  







E x x ∂
∂
= = β .  It may 
be useful to point out that standard coefficients, even if they are more difficult to analyse, are 
constant for all the values of the relative independent variable. On the contrary, in our estimations 
the elasticity of a dependent variable is not constant because the model is linear.  
14 On the contrary we do not find a non linear relationship between unemployment rate and 
centralization. Therefore we cannot prove the traditional theoretical hypothesis (Bruno Sachs, 
1985) that both highly-centralized systems and strongly decentralized systems perform better than 
any intermediate bargaining systems in causing unemployment.   
 16 
decreases. Nevertheless, we should be cautious in interpreting this result because the 
signs of the variables CGF and CFG2 are the opposite in the OLS Method.      
Also the economic performances of regions – measured by GDP growth and 
investment per capita (INVPOP) – have negative impacts on unemployment rates. The 
latter variable has a standard coefficient which is double that of the former. 
Also interesting are the values of the two structural factors coefficients. As to be 
expected, the unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the good performance of 
the regional labour market (high activity and employment rate, high share of employment 
in the industrial and advanced services sectors) measured by the first factor (FF).  
It is more difficult to explain the positive relationship between the unemployment rate 
and the second factor, which relates to the large share of services and high demographic 
density. In this case the results seem to confirm the empirical evidence – as also reported 
in the third Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in the EU – that “cities act 
as centres of employment for a widely-drawn population, with one in every three jobs 
being taken by someone commuting into the city” (Commission of the European 
Communities, Third Progress Report on Cohesion, page 22). For this reason, 
unemployment and social problems in the European Union are more severe in urban 
centres, as well as in regard to the tertiarization process now characterizing economic 




Results of the Panel Data Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  MLE  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 coefficient  P-level  Coefficient  P-level  coefficient P-level  coefficient  P-level 
CONS 10.763 0.01 -16.871 0.00  -12.303 0.00 -24.931 0.00
FF 2.233 0.00 1.706 0.00  1.849 0.00 1.183 0.00
SF 1.388 0.00 1.784 0.00  1.578 0.00 2.633 0.00
GDPR 0.181 0.00 -0.046 0.02 -0.044 0.04 -0.037 0.08
INVPOP -0.002 0.01 -0.002 0.00  -0.002 0.00 -0.001 0.00
BUREAUCRACY 2.646 0.00 1.855 0.00 2.064 0.00 1.558 0.00
CENTR -0.083 0.00 0.047 0.00 0.029 0.01 0.077 0.00
CGF -0.179 0.02 0.528 0.00  0.402 0.00 0.753 0.00
CFG2 0.001 0.13 -0.004 0.00 -0.003 0.00 -0.005 0.00
                
Num.  obs.  1090   1090   1090   1090  
Num. groups      109   109   109  
R2 0.5777              
R2corr 0.5746              
F(8,1081) 184.87 0.00            
Log likelihood      -2399.9584          
LR chi2(8)      378.58 0.00         
R-sq within          0.2704   0.2929  
R-sq between          0.4689   0.2909  
R-sq overall          0.4466   0.2861  
Random effect u_i                 
Corr(u_i,X)         0   -0.392700  
Sigma u          3.1659   5.289283  
Sigma e          1.7714   1.771356  
rho (% of the variance due to u)          0.7616   0.899155  
Wald chi2(8)          479.46      
F(8,973)             50.39 0.000
Hausmann Test  (Ho : corr (ui, X)=0) 
CHI2 (  8); Prob>CHI2            113.92 0.00018 
 
Table 5 
Mean, Standard deviation (s.d), 
parameters (fixed effect), standard coefficients (s.c.), elasticity  at mean value (el.) 
Variable Mean  s.d  .    parameter s. c.  el. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE   10.885  6.064       
CONSTANT    -24.931  
FF -0.300  1.766 1.183 0.344 -0.033 
SF 0.171  1.384 2.633 0.601 0.041 
GDPR 2.029  3.260 -0.037 -0.020 -0.007 
INVPOP 50.239  178.694 -0.001 -0.044 -0.007 
BUREAUCRACY 3.974  0.143 1.558 0.037 0.569 
CENTR 25.747  16.247 0.077 0.207 0.183 
CGF 73.082  8.256 0.753
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